VCU professor finds decision-making similarities among U.S. presidents

By Mike Frontiero and William Newmann

RICHMOND, Va. - As national security decisions about the Middle East and Asia dominate President George W. Bush's agenda, a new book reveals how decision-making in the modern White House really works.

In his timely book "Managing National Security Policy: The President and the Process," William W. Newmann, Ph.D., assistant professor and director of undergraduate programs in Virginia Commonwealth University's School of Government and Public Affairs, examined case studies relating to how the administrations of presidents Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush made decisions about nuclear strategy and arms control. He interviewed key members of their national security teams, including James Baker, Brent Scowcroft and Zbigniew Brzezinski. The purpose was to see how a president changes his decision-making structure over time and what he learns that leads him to change the advisory process.

Despite their differences, Newmann found all three presidents made important decisions the same way. "I was surprised by the similarities among the administrations," he said. "They were three different people with different levels of experience when they came into office, along with different belief systems." Carter, a Democrat with little experience in foreign affairs; Reagan, a Republican with little foreign affairs experience but with a definite viewpoint on the subject and Bush, the Washington insider's insider with experience in foreign affairs, a moderate and a pragmatist.

Each administration began its tenure with a standard set of interagency committees as part of the National Security Council process, a typical, formal decision-making process that nearly all presidents have employed, according to Newmann.  Midway into the first year of their terms each administration developed an informal process in which the senior advisers met without their staff to create consensus within the senior layers of the administration. For Carter and Bush these groups included the secretaries of state and defense and the national security adviser. Reagan's group was somewhat larger. These informal groups met both with and without the president.  Further down the line each president also began to lean on one or two advisers more than the others, a confidence structure, which gave the president a last stop for advice before he would make a decision. 

Though each administration made similar decision changes, Newmann found each president used the three structures - formal, informal, and confidence - in different ways, depending on his individual management style. 

Carter relied heavily on his confidence structure. "This was disastrous for his administration," said Newmann. "His secretary of state eventually resigned over being excluded from the decision to launch a rescue mission for the hostages in Iran."

Reagan used National Security Adviser William Clark as his key adviser in 1982 and 1983, until a rivalry between Clark and other senior White House staffers led to Clark's transfer to another post, and Reagan's subsequent reliance on the formal structure.  "As a result, many issues went unresolved for great lengths of time, in particular, issues concerning arms control, the Middle East, and Latin America."

Bush favored the informal structure, but used a combination of all three decision-making processes.  A group of eight senior advisers worked together as a collegial team, while a smaller group consisting of Secretary of State James Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, met informally to solidify an administration consensus. Bush�s close personal relationships with Baker and Scowcroft also gave him two advisers within his confidence structure. "This doesn't necessarily mean Bush made better decisions, just that he had a good process and there was less fighting within his administration," said Newmann.